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Abstract—Blockchain technology has gained immense popu-
larity in the recent years due to its decentralized computing
architecture. While it originally emerged as a technology for
(crypto)currencies, it has since found many different application
areas including (but not limited to) payments, money transfers,
smart contracts, supply-chain management, networking, IoT,
etc. Initially, it was only Bitcoin, the de facto standard for
cryptocurrencies, but then it was followed by several (in fact
hundreds of) others. Each new cryptocurrency had or claimed
to have certain advantages over Bitcoin, such as transaction
speed and cost. However, they all relied on the original idea of
distributed ledger where each block has maintained a complete
history of each transaction in the network. Blockchain technology
has more recently been challenged by two new technologies called
Tangle and Hashgraph, which are “directed acyclic graphs”,
i.e. in layman’s terms blockchains without blocks and chains.
IOTA network is the original Tangle technology, which relies on
ternary arithmetic architecture and uses ternary hash function
“Troika”. It works on GF (3) and its design follows the sponge
construction. Two of the main claims of IOTA are scalability
and micro-transitions, both of which are likely to utilize compact
hardware platforms in practical implementations. In this paper,
an almost-zero logic compact and yet adequately fast hardware
architectures of Troika hash function targeting reconfigurable de-
vices are presented. The proposed architectures mainly depend on
the utilization of BRAMs on FPGAs. Three different RAM-based
hardware implementations have been realized on Xilinx Artix-7
xc7a12tcpg238-3 device; all using only a single BRAM tile with
minimal number of LUTs and FFs. The proposed architectures
can easily be implemented on different reconfigurable devices
with similar efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first reported hardware implementation of Troika hash function
on reconfigurable devices which is also compact and fast.
I. INTRODUCTION
In very simple terms, a blockchain is a growing list of
records (blocks) which are linked to each other using cryp-
tographic techniques. Each block contains a cryptographic
hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and the transaction
data [1]. In other terms, the list of all transactions since the
creation of the blockchain is kept by all the blocks in the chain,
with new transactions being added on to existing ones. The
whole network is fully distributed and decentralized, there is
no central authority who has control over the ecosystem [2].
Such an architecture makes it resistant to modification of the
data by design; the recorded data in any given block cannot
be modified retroactively without alteration of all subsequent
blocks and the consensus of the network majority.
As a result of these properties, blockchain has been the
underlying technology for cryptocurrencies, especially as the
public transaction ledger of the cryptocurrency bitcoin [3].
The introduction of Bitcoin Cash (BCH) [3] design has in-
spired many other cryptocurrencies. Among these, Ethereum
(ETH) [4], Litecoin (LTC) [5], Ripple (XRP) [6] and IOTA [7]
are just a few popular examples.
Decentralized architecture of blockchain technology, which
makes it so trustworthy and desirable for secure transactions,
also makes it so cumbersome. Each transaction within the
network must be distributed throughout the whole network,
making it extremely slow. The transaction speed for Bitcoin
can be as high as tens of minutes [8]. As a result, several
attempts have been made in order to speed up blockchain, such
as the lightning network [9]. In addition to modifications on
the original blockchains, new technologies, namely “Tangle”
and “Hashgraph” have also been introduced. Both have certain
advantages and also disadvantages over blockchain.
In our study, we focus on Tangle [10], which differentiates
itself from other decentralized networks. It is actually not a
blockchain. While preserving the decentralization and secu-
rity features of blockchain, the Tangle forms the distributed
ledger like a web of information instead of forming blocks to
create a chain of information. Tangle aims to solve problems
like scaling and slow transaction times that other blockchain
projects are currently struggling with.
The name of the token in Tangle network, which also is
the name of the foundation that has developed the Tangle
technology, is IOTA. The security of the core components in
IOTA system still relies on the security of a cryptographic
hash function and it is crucial that the hash function fulfills
the security requirements in order to ensure the validity of the
transactions on the Tangle. In previous works, Keccak/SHA-
3 [11] has been used as the underlying hash function in
IOTA system [12]. In 2018, Troika [13] is announced by
CYBERCRYPT as a new ternary hash function for IOTAs
ternary architecture and platform. Troika is based on sponge-
based construction [14], which uses a ternary permutation
function with state and output lengths of 729 and 243 trits,
respectively.
One of the main target applications of Tangle is the Internet-
of-Things. However, it is very unlikely that today’s IoT devices
will be able to cope with proof-of-work (PoW) computational
requirements of Tangle. In fact, it has been demonstrated that
both PoW and transaction signing are not practical without
hardware-accelerated cryptography on battery-powered de-
vices [15]. Low-cost Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
devices, with their capability to implement both cryptographic
and logic functions are viable choices as hardware acceleration
and implementation platforms for Troika and consequently
IOTA. Furthermore, it is also possible to implement Troika
hash function utilizing mainly the block RAMs (BRAMs) on
the FPGA with minimal usage of look-up tables (LUTs) and
flip-flops (FFs), thereby freeing more logic for other functions.
In this work, an almost-zero logic and fast hardware ar-
chitecture of Troika hash function on configurable devices
(FPGAs) is presented. Three different variants of the proposed
architecture have been implemented on a state-of-the-art Xil-
inx Artix-7 FPGA device. Each of these implementations take
the same amount of cycles to process a new data block and
use 1 BRAM tile. The LUT and register utilization for these
three different implementations slightly differ due to different
implementation targets. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first academic work on hardware implementation of Troika
hash function.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: The
Troika ternary hash function is presented in Section II. Sec-
tions III and IV describe the architecture and implementation
of Troika on FPGA platform in detail and, finally, Section V
discusses the results of the proposed implementations.
II. TROIKA – A TERNARY HASH FUNCTION
Troika [13] is announced by CYBERCRYPT in 2018 as
a new ternary hash function designed especially for IOTAs
ternary architecture and platform. It is a sponge-based con-
struction (Figure 1) with a permutation designed for ternary
platforms. It works on a state of 729 trits with a rate r of
243 trits and capacity c of 486 trits. Its output length is 243
trits. The claimed security level is 243 trits for first and second








Fig. 1. Overview of sponge construction
The 729-trit state is organized as a 9x3x27 cuboid of trits.
The designers of Troika use the same naming convention as in
Keccak/SHA-3 [11] in order to address different parts of the








Fig. 2. Naming convention for Troika state (9x3x27 cuboid)
For the hash computation, the state is initialized with all
zeros. A message is padded by appending a 1 and a number
of zeros (to make it a multiple of 243 trits) at its end. The
padded message is then formatted into n blocks of r = 243
trits each. Each 243-trit message block is then assigned to
the rate part of the state followed by a chained call to the
f function, which is a 729-trit permutation. Specifically, the
243-trit rate part of the state corresponds to the first nine slices
of the state. A 729-trit Troika permutation f is used to update
the 729-trit state for 24 rounds.
One round of Troika permutation updates the state using the
following operations:
• SubTrytes: A 3-trit (1 tryte) Sbox in GF(3) is applied on
each tryte of the state. Define
F (x0, x1, x2) = (x0, x1, x0 · x1 + x2)
and the trit permutations
π(x0, x1, x2) = (x1, x2, x0)
ρ(x0, x1, x2) = (x2, x1, x0).
Then the Sbox output is defined via
(x0, x1, x2) → ρ(F (π(F (π(F (x0 − 1, x1, x2)))))).
This corresponds to a 3-round source-heavy unbal-
anced 3-trit Feistel network with the Feistel function
F , the cyclic shift π, the additional affine mapping
((x0, x1, x2) → (x0 − 1, x1, x2)) at the input, and the
trit permutation ρ at the output.
The mapping SubTrytes on the entire state X is then
defined as Xi,j,k → s(Xi,j,k).
• ShiftRows: Each row of the state is rotated by a constant
amount.
















• ShiftLanes: Each lane of the state is rotated by an amount
read from a look-up table.















where Ri,j are read from the look-up table.
• AddColumnParity: Trits of each column are updated by
adding sum of parities of two adjacent columns.
This mapping provides diffusion along columns by
adding to each column xx,.,z the parities of the two
adjacent columns xx−1,.,z and xx+1,.,z+1, where indices
are taken modulo their respective dimensions.
• AddRoundConstant: A round-dependent constant is
added to the (rows of) state.
AddRoundConstant is the only mapping in the round
transformation that differs from round to round. It is
defined as
x.,0,. → x.,0,. +RC
r.
III. TROIKA ARCHITECTURE ON FPGA
Troika is similar to Keccak with its permutation-heavy
structure. However, unlike Keccak where addition and multi-
plication are bitwise and can be implemented with single XOR
and AND gate, respectively, Troika operations are ternary
operations, i.e. trit-wise, as shown in Figure 3. The Troika
Sbox uses a 3-stage Feistel structure, where one ternary
multiplication and one ternary addition takes place at each
stage. The gate count (in our case LUT count) for a single
Sbox depends on the gate counts for trit-wise addition and
multiplication circuits. Therefore, we have decided to start
with optimizing implementation of these two gates.
+ 0 1 2 × 0 1 2
0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
1 1 2 0 1 0 1 2
2 2 0 1 2 0 2 1
Fig. 3. Ternary trit-wise addition (left) and multiplication (right) operations
Due to the binary nature of logic implemented within the
FPGAs, ternary operations need to be implemented using
binary gates. This requires selection of a binary representation
for ternary symbols prior to circuit implementation. The most
basic and also one of the most area effective representation
is using ‘00’, ‘01’ and ‘10’ for ternary symbols 0, 1 and 2,
respectively. Previous studies in the literature suggest other
more efficient representations, such as ‘01’, ‘11’ and ‘10’ as
given in [16].
Although initially we tried all 24 (4!) possible represen-
tations, we decided to go with a different approach, where
we represent the ternary symbols with 3 bits, using a scheme
similar to one-hot encoding. In our representation, 0, 1 and 2
are represented using ‘001’, ‘010’ and ‘100’, respectively. The
truth tables using this representation are given in Figure 4.
+ 001 010 100 × 001 010 100
001 001 010 100 001 001 001 001
010 010 100 001 010 001 010 100
100 100 001 010 100 001 100 010
Fig. 4. Truth tables for ternary addition (left) and multiplication (right) using
the selected representation
This representation simplified the binary definitions for
ternary operations considerably:
• Ternary addition formulas:
y2 = (a0 ∧ b2) ∨ (a1 ∧ b1) ∨ (a2 ∧ b0)
y1 = (a0 ∧ b1) ∨ (a1 ∧ b0) ∨ (a2 ∧ b2)
y0 = ¬(y1 ∨ y2)
• Ternary multiplication formulas:
y2 = ¬(y1 ∨ y0)
y1 = (a1 ∧ b1) ∨ (a2 ∧ b2)
y0 = a0 ∨ b0
Conversion between default 2-bit ternary representation to
our ternary representation is also quite simple, making it
possible to store ternary symbols (trits) in 2-bit registers:
• 2-bit ternary (d1d0) to 3-bit ternary (b2b1b0) conversion:
b2 = d1
b1 = d0
b0 = ¬(b2 ∨ b1)
• 3-bit ternary (b2b1b0) to 2-bit ternary (d1d0) conversion:
d1 = b2
d0 = b1
Using the 3-bit representation, ternary adder, ternary multi-
plier and ternary S-box require 3, 3 and 16 LUTs, respectively.
While this coding solves the area problem for a single S-
box and it is possible to come up with a serial implementation
using a single S-box, the state size is still a big problem. Troika
state requires storage of 729 trits, which is equivalent to 1458
bits. A register-based implementation would occupy just too
many registers, which is a precious commodity for a low-
cost FPGA. As going with high-end FPGAs would directly
contradict with our initial target of a low-cost implementation
targeting IoT applications, we opted for a RAM-based archi-
tecture.
We efficiently use BRAM tiles of Xilinx 7 Series FP-
GAs [17] (an Artix-7 device is selected) to store Troika state,
where the Troika hashing algorithm is implemented using two
dual-port RAMs: 1458-trit (1458x3-bit ) RAM-1 and 729-trit
(729x3-bit) RAM-2. In the placement these are interpreted
as a single BRAM tile consisting of two 18K BRAMs (see
Section V). The required state contents are called trit-by-trit
in every clock cycle with an algorithm-specific addressing
scheme in order to apply the corresponding round’s f function
operations.
In addition to the RAMs, a single Sbox, a single accumu-
lator to implement parity generator functionality for columns
and a round constant generator are used to implement the full
Troika functionality. These blocks are implemented on LUTs
using combinational logic.
The functional operation of the architecture takes place in
a data loading phase (WriteInput), two operation phases for
each round and result reading phase (ReadOutput). It can be
summarized as follows:
• Data loading phase: Initially, data is divided into 243-
trit blocks and padded using the specified Troika padding
scheme. This phase is executed by the external processor.
The first 243 trits are loaded to the first 243 locations
inside RAM-1. The following 486 locations are then
loaded with all-zero trits (using our representation with
‘001’ bits). This completes the state initialization step
of the algorithm. The initialized state is then applied 24
rounds of the Troika permuation, f .
• Phase-1: In this phase, three operations of Troika per-
mutation are executed. These are SubTrytes, ShiftRows
and ShiftLanes, respectively. In implementation of the
SubTrytes, each trit is read from the first 729 locations
(first half) of RAM-1, one by one in order. Every read trit
is shifted into a 2-trit shift register. At every 3 trits (i.e. 1
tryte), combined output of the shift register is sent into the
Sbox, which generates the corresponding 1-tryte parallel
output combinationally. This output is then shifted into a
second 2-trit shift register. Output of the shift register
is written into both the second 729 locations (second
half) in RAM-1 and the RAM-2. However, in writing the
result, instead of a linearly increasing addressing scheme,
a much more complex addressing scheme is used. This
scheme is fact corresponds to the combined ShiftRows
and ShiftLanes permutations. Once all trits in the first
half of RAM-1 are processed, Phase-1 is completed.
• Phase-2: In this phase, three read operations are done
in parallel: One from trits of the columns in increasing
order from second half of RAM-1, and the other two
from the trits of the two adjacent columns from both
ports of RAM-2. While all 3 trits of adjacent columns
are added to form adjacent column parities, the main
column trits are stored in a 3-trit shift register. After every
3rd read trit, required column parities are accumulated
and are added to the stored target column trits. This
completes the AddColumnParity operation. In parallel,
the round constant generator circuit, which is an 11-tap
ternary LFSR is run. However, its output is updated once
in every third trit and added to the AddColumnParity
output. The resultant output is the round function f
output, and it is written back to the first half of RAM-
1 in increasing address order. Once, all the columns are
processed, Phase-2 and therefore the corresponding round
is completed, and the output is back in the first half of
RAM-1.
• Output reading phase: The two operation phases are
repeated for a total of 24 times, which completes the
Troika permutation function on the target data block.
Once, it is completed, if there are further data blocks
to be processed, the next 243-trit data block is loaded to
the first 243 locations of RAM-1. However, this time the
following 486 locations are NOT cleared. They are left
untouched, and the whole 2-phase 24-round permutation
is repeated. Upon completion of processing of all data
blocks, the result is read from the first 243 locations of
RAM-1 by the host processor.
The operation and data flow of this scheme and the corre-
sponding block diagram are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Note that the 2-to-3 and 3-to-2 bit transform blocks (marked
in RED) between memories (registers and RAMs) and com-
binational logic are only used in implementations 2 and 3.
In this scheme, each phase takes 734 cycles to complete,
resulting in a total of 35232 cycles for 24 rounds of Troika.
In addition, 243 clock cycles are needed to write the new
input block to RAM-1 in every 24 rounds. As stated earlier, it
is assumed that data is written to RAM-1 by a host processor
and therefore it is not implemented as part of our architecture.
Hashing of one message block takes 35475 clock cycles
(approximately 35K clock cycles).
In our architecture, registers are only used for temporary
data storage and implementation of state machines of the
complex addressing scheme and the round constant generator.
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
We have implemented three variants of this architecture,
which differ from each other in minor details:
• Implementation 1: This version implements exactly the
functionality explained in the previous section. It requires
use of a 1458x3 and a 729x3 RAM. In practice, two block
RAMs of a single BRAM slice are used, both in 2048x8
configuration. While not used in this version, this gives
us flexibility for future implementations (such as masked
implementations with multiple shares).
• Implementation 2: In this version, each trit is stored
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Fig. 5. Data flow of Troika FPGA implementation
2-bit trits are then converted to 3-bit trit representations
at the output of the RAMs for Sbox and column parity
logic operations, and then re-converted back to 2-bit
representations at the input of RAMs. This architecture
requires use of a 1458x2 and a 729x2 RAM, which in
practice has no effect on the overall area. However, it
also uses less LUTs and flip-flops, and leaves more space
inside RAMs for possible future extensions.
• Implementation 3: This version is derived from the
second implementation, i.e. it too stores each trit us-
ing 2 bits. However, this time the look-up table where
ShiftLanes parameters are stores are not implemented as
combinational logic. Instead, they too are stored inside
RAM, to be specific, in the 27 locations following the
first 729 locations of RAM-2. Morever, they require 5-
bits for storage. In other words, this time RAM-2 size is
756x5 bits. Again, it does not change anything in terms
of RAM usage. However, total number of used LUTs is
reduced considerably.
V. RESULTS
All designs are simulated and tested in ModelSim using the
available test vectors in the Troika specification document.
All three implementations are synthesized and placed using
Xilinx’s Vivado Design Suite v2019.1 on a small FPGA. In
order to demonstrate the area effectiveness of our architectures,
we opted for the smallest version of Xilinx Artix-7 devices,
i.e. xc7a12tcpg238-3. The area results are given in Table I
for all implementation flavors. In our implementations, we
targeted minimal area. However, the designs also proved to
be rather high speed, i.e. about 150 MHz for all three imple-
mentations, respectively, corresponding to a hashing speed of
4200 blocks/sec. If encoded, a transaction in IOTA consists of
2673 trytes [18] and the average transaction (confirmation)
time is reported to be around 1-2 minutes [19]. So, our
hashing speed seems to be in line with IOTA transaction speed
according to these values.
TABLE I
TROIKA HASH FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS ON XILINX
ARTIX-7 (XC7A12TCPG238-3) FPGA
Impl 1 Impl 2 Impl 3 Available
LUT slices 227 206 190 8000
– as Logic 214 193 183 8000
– as Shift Reg 13 13 7 5000
Register slices (as FF) 180 160 191 16000
Block RAM tiles 1 1 1 20
– as RAMB18E1 only 2 2 2 40
As expected, the second version of Troika implementation
saves both LUT and flip-flops thanks to the savings coming
from the 2-bit operations (except for the switch to the ternary
operations). The third implementation saves LUT slices as the
shift amount look-up table is stored in the RAM, while using
more flip-flops. However, the total number of slices used is
lower, resulting in the most compact circuit. All three versions
require only two block RAMs, or in other words only a single
BRAM tile.
To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the only
hardware implementation of Troika hash function to date. In
addition, the only available software implementation is the
reference implementation provided by CYBERCRYPT. Due
to lack of implementations in the literature, it is unfortunately
not possible to compare our results with other works.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, three different hardware implementations of
Troika hash function, which is designed as a hash function for
the cryptocurrency IOTA, are proposed. All implementations



























Fig. 6. Block Diagram Troika FPGA implementation
from Xilinx 7 Series FPGAs. The utilization of LUT and flip-
flop slice are based on the datapath implementation and the
efficient utilization of BRAM spaces. Using this approach, we
have achieved an almost-zero logic implementation, however
with an acceptable hashing speed. Our speed target is derived
from the reported highest speeds in [15]. It is of course
possible to lower the total cycle count and hence increase
throughput, but at the expense of additional Sboxes and
BRAMs, which would contradict with our almost zero logic
target in this study.
We can conclude that the proposed implementations in
this paper would be mainly interesting for existing FPGA
applications that already occupy a lot of LUTs and FFs,
but have many available DSP slices and BRAM tiles. As
a future work, we plan to implement fully parallel versions
of Troika for even faster implementations. We also plan to
explore protected versions against physical attacks.
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